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Abstract
We consider a general nonzero-sum impulse game with two players. The main mathemat-
ical contribution of the paper is a verification theorem which provides, under some regularity
conditions, a suitable system of quasi-variational inequalities for the payoffs and the strate-
gies of the two players at some Nash equilibrium. As an application, we study an impulse
game with a one-dimensional state variable, following a real-valued scaled Brownian motion,
and two players with linear and symmetric running payoffs. We fully characterize a family of
Nash equilibria and provide explicit expressions for the corresponding equilibrium strategies
and payoffs. We also prove some asymptotic results with respect to the intervention costs.
Finally, we consider two further non-symmetric examples where a Nash equilibrium is found
numerically.
Keywords: stochastic differential game, impulse control, Nash equilibrium, quasi-variational
inequality.
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1 Introduction
In this article, we study a general two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential game with impulse
controls. In few words, after setting the general framework, we focus on the notion of Nash
equilibrium and identify the corresponding system of quasi-variational inequalities (QVIs). As an
application, we consider an impulse game with a one-dimensional state variable and fully solve the
system of QVIs, obtaining explicit expressions for the equilibrium payoffs and the corresponding
strategies. This paper represents an extension of the results in the Ph.D. thesis [6].
More specifically, we consider a game where two players can affect a continuous-time stochastic
process X by discrete-time interventions which consist in shifting X to a new state. When none
of the players intervenes, we assume X to diffuse according to a standard stochastic differential
equation. Each intervention corresponds to a cost for the intervening player and a gain for the
opponent. The strategy of player i ∈ {1, 2} is determined by a couple ϕi = (Ci, ξi), where Ci is
a fixed open subset and ξi is a continuous function: namely, player i intervenes if and only if the
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process X exits from Ci and, when this happens, she shifts the process from state x to state ξi(x).
If both the players want to intervene, we assume that player 1 has the priority over player 2. Once
the strategies ϕi = (Ci, ξi), i ∈ {1, 2}, and a starting point x have been chosen, a couple of impulse
controls {(τi,k, δi,k)}k≥1 is uniquely defined: τi,k is the k-th intervention time of player i and δi,k
is the corresponding impulse. Each player aims at maximizing her payoff, defined as follows: for
every x belonging to some fixed subset S ⊆ Rd and every couple of strategies (ϕ1, ϕ2), we set
J i(x;ϕ1, ϕ2) := Ex
[ ∫ τS
0
e−ρisfi(Xs)ds+
∑
k≥1 : τi,k<τS
e−ρiτi,kφi
(
X(τi,k)− , δi,k
)
+
∑
k≥1 : τj,k<τS
e−ρiτj,kψi
(
X(τj,k)− , δj,k
)
+ e−ρiτShi(XτS )1{τS<+∞}
]
, (1.1)
where i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j and τS is the exit time of X from S. The couple (ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2) is a Nash
equilibrium if
J1(x;ϕ∗1, ϕ
∗
2) ≥ J1(x;ϕ1, ϕ∗2), and J2(x;ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2) ≥ J2(x;ϕ∗1, ϕ2), (1.2)
for every couple of strategies ϕ1, ϕ2.
The first contribution of our paper is the Verification Theorem 3.3, which connects the game in
(1.1) to a suitable system of QVIs. To the best of our knowledge, nonzero-sum games with impulse
controls have never been considered from a QVI perspective before.
Namely, in Theorem 3.3 we consider the following system of QVIs:
Vi = hi, in ∂S,
MjVj − Vj ≤ 0, in S,
HiVi − Vi = 0, in {MjVj − Vj = 0},
max
{AVi − ρiVi + fi,MiVi − Vi} = 0, in {MjVj − Vj < 0},
(1.3)
where i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, A is the infinitesimal generator of the uncontrolled state process and
Mi,Hi are suitable intervention operators defined in Section 3.1. If two functions Vi, with i ∈
{1, 2}, are a solution to (1.3), have polynomial growth and satisfy the regularity condition
Vi ∈ C2(Dj \ ∂Di) ∩ C1(Dj) ∩ C(S), (1.4)
where j ∈ {1, 2} with j 6= i and Dj = {MjVj − Vj < 0}, then they coincide with some Nash
equilibrium payoffs and a characterization of the corresponding equilibrium strategy is possible.
Our second contribution to this stream of research consists in providing examples of solvable
impulse games. Using the Verification Theorem 3.3 described above and solving the system of
QVIs (1.3), we are able to characterize the Nash equilibria. The main example is described in
Sections 4.1-4.4, where (1.3) is analytically solved and explicit formulas are provided. In Section
4.5 we consider further families of problems, where (1.3) is solved numerically. To our knowledge,
these are the first examples of solvable nonzero-sum impulse games.
In Sections 4.1 we consider a two-player impulse game with a one-dimensional state variable
X, modelled by a real-valued (scaled) Brownian motion. The two players have symmetric linear
running payoffs and they can intervene on X by shifting it from its current state, say x, to some
other state x + δ, with δ ∈ R. When a player intervenes, she faces a penalty while her opponent
faces a gain, both consisting in a fixed and in a variable part, which is assumed proportional to
the size of the impulse. Hence, the players objective functions are
J1(x;ϕ1, ϕ2) :=Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρs(Xs−s1)ds−
∑
k≥1
e−ρτ1,k(c+λ|δ1,k|)+
∑
k≥1
e−ρτ2,k(c˜+λ˜|δ2,k|)
]
,
J2(x;ϕ1, ϕ2) :=Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρs(s2−Xs)ds−
∑
k≥1
e−ρτ2,k(c+λ|δ2,k|)+
∑
k≥1
e−ρτ1,k(c˜+λ˜|δ1,k|)
]
,
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where {(τi,k, δi,k)}k≥1 denotes the impulse control of player i associated to the strategies ϕ1, ϕ2.
Some preliminary heuristics on the QVIs in (1.3) leads us to consider a pair of candidates for the
functions Vi. Then, a careful application of the verification theorem shows that such candidates
actually coincide with the payoff functions of some Nash equilibrium. In particular, a practical
characterization of the associated Nash equilibria is possible: player 1 (resp. player 2) intervenes
when the state X is smaller than x¯1 (resp. greater than x¯2) and moves the process to x
∗
1 (resp. x
∗
2),
for suitable x¯i, x
∗
i . We provide explicit expressions for the payoff functions and for the parameters
x¯i, x
∗
i . Finally, we study the behaviour of the intervention region in some limit cases. In particular,
we remark that in the case where c = c˜ and λ = λ˜, the game does not have an admissible Nash
equilibrium.
Finally, in Section 4.5 we consider two further families of examples, with cubic payoffs and
with linear and cubic payoffs. We adapt the technique described above and characterize a Nash
equilibrium by solving the system of QVIs numerically.
In applications where controllers act on the underlying process by discrete-time interventions,
impulse controls offer a more realistic model with respect to standard continuous-time controls,
even though at the cost of a more challenging technical framework. Quite surprisingly, however,
the case of nonzero-sum games with impulse controls did not deserve enough attention so far.
For a comprehensive introduction to impulse controls and the corresponding single-player con-
trol problems, we refer the reader to [24]. Among recent works on single-player impulse control
problems, we cite [7] for a general verification result, [4, 5] for computational schemes for Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman QVIs, [2] for the Merton problem with fixed and proportional transaction costs.
As for stopping games treated with QVI techniques, we cite the seminal works [22], for the zero-
sum case, and [8], for the nonzero-sum case. For recent examples, see [15, 18], and the references
therein. It is also worth mentioning [17], which provides a link between two-player nonzero-sum
games of optimal stopping and two-player nonzero-sum games of singular control.
Regarding stochastic games with impulse controls, as well as games with mixed impulse and
continuous controls, the existing literature almost entirely focuses on the zero-sum case. We refer
to [3, 26] for zero-sum games where one player uses continuous controls and the opponent takes
impulse controls. For zero-sum games where both players use impulse controls, we cite [25] for the
case with delay and the recent works [16, 19] for a viscosity approach. In particular, we notice that
the system of QVIs proposed in [16] for zero-sum impulse games can be obtained as a particular
case of our framework, see Section 2 below.
Only the two papers [13, 14] deal with some nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with
impulse controls and finite horizon, using an approach based on backward stochastic differential
equations and the maximum principle. Notice that in those two papers the sequence of stopping
times along which impulses can be applied is given, hence the players can choose only the size of
the impulses. To the best of our knowledge, nonzero-sum impulse games are here considered for
the first time in a general form.
The outline of the paper is the following. In Section 2 we rigorously formulate the general
impulse game and give the notions of admissible strategies and of Nash equilibrium. Section 3
provides the associated system of QVIs and the corresponding verification theorem. In Section
4 we analytically compute a family of Nash equilibria for a one-dimensional impulse game and
provide two further examples with numerical solutions. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
Acknowledgements. The authors would like to thank Je´roˆme Renault, Fabien Gensbittel and
the anonymous referees for their valuable comments and suggestions. The authors also gratefully
acknowledge funding from the SID research project “New perspectives in stochastic methods for
finance and energy markets” and from the Visiting Scientist program of the University of Padova,
and from the Finance For Energy Market Research Centre (FiME) in Paris.
2 Nonzero-sum stochastic impulse games
In this section we introduce a general class of two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games
with impulse controls.
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Let (Ω, F , {Ft}t≥0, P) be a filtered probability space whose filtration satisfies the usual condi-
tions of right-continuity and P-completeness, and let {Wt}t≥0 be a k-dimensional {Ft}t≥0-adapted
Brownian motion. For every t ≥ 0 and ζ ∈ L2(Ft), we denote by Y t,ζ = {Y t,ζs }s≥t a solution to
the problem
dY t,ζs = b(Y
t,ζ
s )ds+ σ(Y
t,ζ
s )dWs, s ≥ t, (2.1)
with initial condition Y t,ζt = ζ, where b : Rd → Rd and σ : Rd → Rd×k are given functions.
Throughout the whole paper, we assume that the coefficients b and σ are globally Lipschitz con-
tinuous, i.e. there exists a constant K > 0 such that for all y1, y2 ∈ Rd we have
|b(y1)− b(y2)|+ |σ(y1)− σ(y2)| ≤ K|y1 − y2|,
so that (2.1) admits a unique strong solution satisfying classical a-priori estimates (see, e.g., [23,
Sect. 5.2] among others).
We consider two players, that will be indexed by i ∈ {1, 2}. Let S be an open subset of Rd
and let Zi be a fixed non-empty subset of Rli , with li ∈ N. Equation (2.1) models the underlying
process when none of the players intervenes. If player i intervenes with some impulse δ ∈ Zi, the
process is shifted from its current state x to a new state Γi(x, δ), where Γi : S ×Zi → S is a given
continuous function. Each intervention corresponds to a cost for the intervening player and to a
gain for the opponent, both depending on the state x and the impulse δ.
The action of the players is modelled via discrete-time controls: an impulse control for player
i is a sequence {
(τi,k, δi,k)
}
k≥1,
where {τi,k}k is a non-decreasing sequence of stopping times (the intervention times) and {δi,k}k
are Zi-valued Fτi,k -measurable random variables (the corresponding impulses).
For the sake of tractability, we assume that the behaviour of the players, modelled by impulse
controls, is driven by strategies, which are defined as follows.
Definition 2.1. A strategy for player i ∈ {1, 2} is a pair ϕi = (Ci, ξi), where Ci is a fixed open
subset of S and ξi is a continuous function from S to Zi.
Strategies determine the action of the players in the following sense. Let x ∈ S be an initial
value for the state variable. Once some strategies ϕi = (Ci, ξi), i ∈ {1, 2}, have been chosen, a pair
of impulse controls {(τx;ϕ1,ϕ2i,k , δx;ϕ1,ϕ2i,k )}k≥1 is uniquely defined by the following procedure:
- player i intervenes if and only if the process exits from Ci,
in which case the impulse is given by ξi(y), where y is the state;
- if both players want to act, player 1 has the priority;
- the game ends when the process exits from S.
(2.2)
The second condition in (2.2) solves the conflict situation when both players would like to shift the
process, at the same time and to different states. In such cases, player 1 has the priority. Notice
that this does not prevent player 2 from intervening immediately after player 1, if the new state is
outside C2. However, we will forbid sequences of infinitely many simultaneous interventions. We
will further comment on that later in this section, see Definition 2.5 and Remark 2.8.
In the following definition we provide a rigorous formalization of the controls associated to a
pair of strategies and the corresponding controlled process, which we denote by Xx;ϕ1,ϕ2 . Moreover
O denotes a generic subset of S and, finally, we adopt the conventions inf ∅ =∞ and [∞,∞[= ∅.
Definition 2.2. Let x ∈ S and let ϕi = (Ci, ξi) be a strategy for player i ∈ {1, 2}. For k ∈
{0, . . . , k¯}, where k¯ = sup{k ∈ N ∪ {0} : τ˜k < αSk }, we define by induction τ˜0 = 0, x0 = x,
X˜0 = Y τ˜0,x0 , αS0 =∞, and
αOk = inf{s > τ˜k−1 : X˜k−1s /∈ O}, [exit time from O ⊆ S]
τ˜k = α
C1
k ∧ αC2k , [intervention time]
mk = 1{αC1k ≤α
C2
k }
+ 21{αC2k <α
C1
k }
, [index of the player interv. at τ˜k]
δ˜k = ξmk
(
X˜k−1τ˜k
)
1{τ˜k<∞}, [impulse]
xk = Γ
mk
(
X˜k−1τ˜k , δ˜k
)
1{τ˜k<∞}, [starting point for the next step]
X˜k = X˜k−11[0,τ˜k[ + Y
τ˜k,xk1[τ˜k,∞[. [contr. process up to the k-th interv.]
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Let k¯i be the number of interventions by player i ∈ {1, 2} before the end of the game, and, in the
case where k¯i 6= 0, let η(i, k) be the index of her k-th intervention (1 ≤ k ≤ k¯i):
k¯i =
∑
1≤h≤k¯1{mh=i}, η(i, k) = min
{
l ∈ N :
∑
1≤h≤l1{mh=i} = k
}
.
Assume now that the times {τ˜k}0≤k≤k¯ never accumulate strictly before αSk¯ , that is, we assume
that in the event {k¯ = +∞} we have limk→k¯ τ˜k = αSk¯ (with the convention αS∞ = supk αSk ).
The controlled process Xx;ϕ1,ϕ2 and the exit time τx;ϕ1,ϕ2S are defined by (with the convention
X˜∞ = limk→+∞ X˜k)
Xx;ϕ1,ϕ2 := X˜ k¯, τx;ϕ1,ϕ2S := α
S
k¯ = inf{s ≥ 0 : Xx;ϕ1,ϕ2s /∈ S}.
Finally, the impulse controls {(τx;ϕ1,ϕ2i,k , δx;ϕ1,ϕ2i,k )}k≥1, with i ∈ {1, 2}, are defined by
τx;ϕ1,ϕ2i,k :=
{
τ˜η(i,k), k ≤ k¯i,
τx;ϕ1,ϕ2S , k > k¯i,
δx;ϕ1,ϕ2i,k :=
{
δ˜η(i,k), k ≤ k¯i,
0, k > k¯i.
(2.3)
When the context is clear and in order to shorten the notations, we will simply write X, τS ,
τi,k, δi,k. Definition 2.2 deserves some comments. First, notice that player 1 has the priority in
the case where both players are willing to intervene, i.e., when αC1k = α
C2
k . Also, we underline
that k¯, k¯1, k¯2 are random variables, reflecting the fact that the number of interventions depends on
ω ∈ Ω. In particular, notice that in the event {k¯ =∞} the convention X˜∞t = limk X˜kt is well-posed
for t ∈ [0, τS [, since X˜k ≡ X˜k+1 in [0, τ˜k+1[ and limk τ˜k = αSk¯ = τS by assumption. Furthermore,
we remark that if player i ∈ {1, 2} intervenes only a finite number of times, i.e., if k¯i is finite, then
the tail of the control is conventionally set to (τi,k, δi,k) = (τS , 0) for k > k¯i. However, notice that
the controlled process X does not jump at time τS . Indeed, by definition the process only jumps
at time τ˜k with k ≤ k¯, in which case we have τ˜k < αSk ≤ αSk¯ = τS . We will further comment
on the choice of such a tail later in this section, after Definition 2.5. Finally, we remark that
Definition 2.2 could be easily extended, even if at the cost of some additional technicalities, to the
pathological case where the times {τ˜k}0≤k≤k¯ accumulate before the end of the game. However, this
is a degenerate situation which is not considered in this paper and, in general, in impulse control
literature: see Definition 2.5 and the corresponding comments.
In the following lemma we give a rigorous formulation to the properties outlined in (2.2).
Lemma 2.3. Let x ∈ S and let ϕi = (Ci, ξi) be a strategy for player i ∈ {1, 2}.
- The process X admits the following representation (with the convention [∞,∞[=∅):
Xs =
k¯−1∑
k=0
Y τ˜k,xks 1[τ˜k,τ˜k+1[(s) + Y
τ˜k¯,xk¯
s 1[τ˜k¯,∞[(s). (2.4)
- The process X is right-continuous. More precisely, X is continuous and satisfies Equation
(2.1) in [0,∞[ \ {τi,k : τi,k < τS}, whereas X is discontinuous at {τi,k : τi,k < τS}, where we
have
Xτi,k = Γ
i
(
X(τi,k)− , δi,k
)
, δi,k = ξi
(
X(τi,k)−
)
, X(τi,k)− ∈ ∂Ci. (2.5)
- The process X never exits from the set C1 ∩ C2.
Proof. We just prove the first property in (2.5), the other ones being immediate. Let i ∈ {1, 2},
k ≥ 1 with τi,k < τS and set σ = η(i, k), with η as in Definition 2.2. By (2.3), (2.4) and Definition
2.2, we have
Xτi,k = Xτ˜σ = Y
τ˜σ,xσ
τ˜σ
= xσ = Γ
i
(
X˜σ−1τ˜σ , δ˜σ
)
= Γi
(
X˜σ−1(τ˜σ)− , δ˜σ
)
= Γi
(
X(τ˜σ)− , δ˜σ
)
= Γi
(
X(τi,k)− , δi,k
)
,
where in the fifth equality we have used the continuity of the process X˜σ−1 in [τ˜σ−1,∞[ and in the
next-to-last equality we exploited the fact that X˜σ−1 ≡ X in [0, τ˜σ[.
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Each player aims at maximizing her payoff, consisting of four discounted terms: a running
payoff, the costs due to her interventions, the gains due to her opponent’s interventions and a
terminal payoff. More precisely, for each i ∈ {1, 2} we consider ρi > 0 (the discount rate) and
continuous functions fi : S → R (the running payoffs), hi : ∂S → R (the terminal payoffs) and
φi : S ×Zi → R, ψi : S ×Zj → R (the interventions’ costs and gains), where j ∈ {1, 2} with j 6= i.
The payoff of player i is defined as follows.
Definition 2.4. Let x ∈ S, let (ϕ1, ϕ2) be a pair of strategies and let τS be defined as in Definition
2.2. For each i ∈ {1, 2}, provided that the right-hand side exists and is finite, we set
J i(x;ϕ1, ϕ2) := Ex
[ ∫ τS
0
e−ρisfi(Xs)ds+
∑
k≥1 : τi,k<τS
e−ρiτi,kφi
(
X(τi,k)− , δi,k
)
+
∑
k≥1 : τj,k<τS
e−ρiτj,kψi
(
X(τj,k)− , δj,k
)
+ e−ρiτShi(XτS )1{τS<+∞}
]
, (2.6)
where j ∈ {1, 2} with j 6= i and {(τi,k, δi,k)}k≥1 is the impulse control of player i associated to the
strategies ϕ1, ϕ2.
As usual in control theory, the subscript in the expectation denotes conditioning with respect
to the available information (hence, it recalls the starting point). Notice that in the summations
above we do not consider stopping times which equal τS , since the game ends in τS . Moreover,
by Definition 2.2 the process does not jump at time τS , so that in (2.6) it is legitimate to write
hi(XτS ) instead of hi(X(τS)−).
In order for J i in (2.6) to be well defined, we now introduce the set of admissible strategies in
x ∈ S.
Definition 2.5. Let x ∈ S and ϕi = (Ci, ξi) be a strategy for player i ∈ {1, 2}. We use the
notations of Definition 2.2 and we say that the pair (ϕ1, ϕ2) is x-admissible if:
1. for i ∈ {1, 2}, the following random variables are in L1(Ω):∫ τS
0
e−ρis|fi|(Xs)ds, e−ρiτS |hi|(XτS ),∑
τi,k<τS
e−ρiτi,k |φi|(X(τi,k)− , δi,k),
∑
τi,k<τS
e−ρiτi,k |ψi|(X(τi,k)− , δi,k);
(2.7)
2. for each p ∈ N, the random variable ‖X‖∞ = supt≥0 |Xt| is in Lp(Ω):
Ex[‖X‖p∞] <∞; (2.8)
3. For i ∈ {1, 2}, we have
lim
k→+∞
τi,k = τS (2.9)
We denote by Φx the set of the x-admissible pairs.
Thanks to the first condition in Definition 2.5, the payoffs J i(x;ϕ1, ϕ2) are well-defined. The
second condition will be used in the proof of the Verification Theorem 3.3. We observe that
(2.8) is practically reasonable. Indeed, in practical applications of competitive games the mutual
continuation region is usually a bounded set (e.g., see the nonzero-sum problems in Section 4, or
the stopping games in [18]), so that |X| is bounded and (2.8) holds. The third condition prevents
each player from accumulating the interventions before τS . This is a usual assumption in impulse
control theory, see, e.g., [24, Ch. 6]. In particular, by this condition we do not admit a sequence of
infinitely many interventions in a same instant t < τS . However, a finite number of simultaneous
interventions is allowed at any time, as we detail in Remark 2.8. Finally, notice that the third
relation is always true if player i intervenes a finite number of times, since in Definition 2.2 the tail
of the controls was conventionally set to be (τi,k, δi,k) = (τS , 0) for k > k¯i.
We conclude the section with the definition of Nash equilibrium and the corresponding payoff
functions in our setting. Notice that the functions Vi are not uniquely defined, but depend on the
Nash equilibrium considered.
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Definition 2.6. Given x ∈ S, we say that (ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2) ∈ Φx is a Nash equilibrium of the game if
J1(x;ϕ∗1, ϕ
∗
2) ≥ J1(x;ϕ1, ϕ∗2), ∀ϕ1 s.t. (ϕ1, ϕ∗2) ∈ Φx,
J2(x;ϕ∗1, ϕ
∗
2) ≥ J2(x;ϕ∗1, ϕ2), ∀ϕ2 s.t. (ϕ∗1, ϕ2) ∈ Φx.
Finally, the payoff functions of a Nash equilibrium are defined as follows: if x ∈ S and a Nash
equilibrium (ϕ∗1, ϕ
∗
2) ∈ Φx exists, we set for i ∈ {1, 2}
Vi(x) := J
i(x;ϕ∗1, ϕ
∗
2).
Remark 2.7. It is technically convenient to deal with functions Vi defined on a closed set. For
this reason, we extend the definitions of J i and Vi to include the trivial cases x ∈ ∂S. Since S is an
open set, in this case the game immediately stops, so that we have τS = 0 and J
i(x;ϕ1, ϕ2) = hi(x)
for each (ϕ1, ϕ2), and hence Vi(x) = hi(x).
Remark 2.8. We remark that a finite number of subsequent simultaneous interventions is allowed
in our framework. Namely, if one of the players intervenes in t ≥ 0, there could be another inter-
vention immediately afterwards, that is, still at time t. If the new state is outside the continuation
region of one of the players, we could have a third intervention in that same instant t, and so on.
However, this can only happen finitely many times, since it is clear that an infinite sequence, here
prevented by the third condition in Definition 2.5, would correspond to a degenerate game.
Remark 2.9. Our definition of strategies is different from the one used in [16], which is an adap-
tation of the notion of non-anticipative strategies a` la Elliott-Kalton [20] (see [21] for the stochastic
case). In the latter, the strategy of any player is designed as a response to her competitor’s strategy
in a non-anticipative way, i.e., it cannot depend on the future strategy. This notion of strategy has
been successfully applied to the study of zero-sum stochastic differential games with continuous
controls, and further strengthened in [11] to deal with their nonzero-sum counterparts. It turns out
that the notion of non-anticipative strategy is very well suited for the viscosity solutions approach.
In the present paper, we have decided to focus on feedback strategies of a particular form mainly for
tractability purposes. Indeed, they are a generalisation of threshold type strategies, that revealed
very effective in order to obtain explicit equilibria (see, e.g., [18]). Moreover, each player’s actions
are still responses to her competitor’s actions even if only through the controlled state variable.
3 A verification theorem
In this section we define a suitable differential problem for the payoff functions at some Nash
equilibrium in nonzero-sum impulse games (see Section 3.1) and prove a verification theorem for
such games (see Section 3.2).
3.1 The quasi-variational inequality problem
We now introduce the differential problem that should be satisfied by the payoff functions of some
Nash equilibrium in our games: this will be key for stating the verification theorem in the next
section.
Let us consider an impulse game as in Section 2. Assume that at some Nash equilibrium the
payoff functions V1, V2 are defined for each x ∈ S (compare Remark 2.7, while for all the operators
introduced in this section it is enough to consider the open set S). Also assume that for i ∈ {1, 2}
there exists a unique, finite, measurable function δi from S to Zi such that
{δi(x)} = arg max
δ∈Zi
{
Vi(Γ
i(x, δ)) + φi(x, δ)
}
, (3.1)
for each x ∈ S. We define the four intervention operators by
MiVi(x) = Vi
(
Γi(x, δi(x))
)
+ φi
(
x, δi(x)
)
,
HiVi(x) = Vi
(
Γj(x, δj(x))
)
+ ψi
(
x, δj(x)
)
,
(3.2)
for x ∈ S and i, j∈{1, 2}, with i 6=j. Notice that MiVi(·)=maxδ{Vi(Γi(·, δ)) + φi(·, δ)}.
7
The functions in (3.1) and (3.2) have an immediate and intuitive interpretation. Let x be
the current state of the process; if player i (resp. player j) intervenes with impulse δ, the present
equilibrium payoff for player i can be written as Vi(Γ
i(x, δ))+φi(x, δ) (resp. Vi(Γ
j(x, δ))+ψi(x, δ)):
we have considered the payoff in the new state and the intervention cost (resp. gain). Hence, δi(x)
in (3.1) is the impulse that player i would use in case she wants to intervene.
Similarly,MiVi(x) (resp. HiVi(x)) represents the payoff for player i when player i (resp. player
j 6= i) takes the best immediate action and behaves optimally afterwards. Notice that it is not
always optimal to intervene, soMiVi(x) ≤ Vi(x), for each x ∈ S, and that player i should intervene
(with impulse δi(x)) only ifMiVi(x) = Vi(x). This gives a heuristic formulation of Nash equilibria,
provided that an explicit expression for Vi is available. The verification theorem will give a rigorous
proof to this heuristic argument. We now characterize the payoff functions Vi.
Assume V1, V2 ∈ C2(S) (weaker conditions will be given later) and define
AVi = b · ∇Vi + 1
2
tr
(
σσtD2Vi
)
,
where b, σ are as in (2.1), σt denotes the transpose of σ and ∇Vi, D2Vi are the gradient and the
Hessian matrix of Vi, respectively. We are interested in the following quasi-variational inequalities
(QVIs) for V1, V2, where i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j:
Vi = hi, in ∂S, (3.3a)
MjVj − Vj ≤ 0, in S, (3.3b)
HiVi − Vi = 0, in {MjVj − Vj = 0}, (3.3c)
max
{AVi − ρiVi + fi,MiVi − Vi} = 0, in {MjVj − Vj < 0}. (3.3d)
We now provide some intuition behind conditions (3.3a)-(3.3d). First of all, the terminal
condition is obvious. Moreover, as we already noticed, (3.3b) is a standard condition in impulse
control theory. For (3.3c), if player j intervenes (i.e., MjVj − Vj = 0), by the definition of Nash
equilibrium we expect that player i does not lose anything: this is equivalent to HiVi − Vi = 0,
otherwise it would be in her interest to deviate. On the contrary, if player j does not intervene
(hence MjVj − Vj < 0), then the problem for player i becomes a classical one-player impulse
control one, Vi satisfies max
{AVi − ρiVi + fi,MiVi − Vi} = 0. In short, the latter condition says
that AVi − ρiVi + fi ≤ 0, with equality in case of non-intervention (i.e., MiVi − Vi < 0).
Remark 3.1. We notice that AVi only appears in {MjVj − Vj < 0}, so that Vi needs to be of
class C2 only in such a region (indeed, this assumption can be slightly relaxed, as we will see).
This represents a difference to the one-player case, where the value function is usually required to
be twice differentiable almost everywhere in S, see [24, Thm. 6.2].
The zero-sum case. A verification theorem will be provided in the next section. Here, as a
preliminary check, we show that we are indeed generalizing the system of QVIs provided in [16],
where the zero-sum case is considered. We show that, if we assume
f := f1 = −f2, φ := φ1 = −ψ2, ψ := ψ1 = −φ2,
h := h1 = −h2, Z := Z1 = Z2, Γ := Γ1 = Γ2,
(3.4)
so that V := V1 = −V2, then the problem in (3.3) reduces to the one considered in [16]. To shorten
the equations, we assume ρ1 = ρ2 = 0 (this makes sense since in [16] a finite-horizon problem is
considered). First of all, we define
M˜V (x) := sup
δ∈Z
{
V (Γ(x, δ)) + φ(x, δ)
}
,
H˜V (x) := inf
δ∈Z
{
V (Γ(x, δ)) + ψ(x, δ)
}
,
for each x ∈ S. It is easy to see that, under the conditions in (3.4), we have
M1V1 = M˜V, M2V2 = −H˜V, H1V1 = H˜V, H2V2 = −M˜V. (3.5)
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By using (3.5), problem (3.3) becomes
V = h, in ∂S, (3.6a)
M˜V ≤ V ≤ H˜V, in S, (3.6b)
AV + f ≤ 0, in {V = M˜V }, (3.6c)
AV + f = 0, in {M˜V < V < H˜V }, (3.6d)
AV + f ≥ 0, in {V = H˜V }. (3.6e)
Simple computations show that problem (3.6) is equivalent to
V = h, in ∂S, (3.7a)
M˜V − V ≤ 0, in S, (3.7b)
min{max{AV + f,M˜V − V }, H˜V − V } = 0, in S, (3.7c)
which is exactly the problem studied in [16], as anticipated.
Lemma 3.2. Problems (3.6) and (3.7) are equivalent.
Proof. Postponed to Appendix A.
3.2 Statement and proof
We provide here the main mathematical contribution of this paper, which is a verification theorem
for the problems formalized in Section 2.
Theorem 3.3 (Verification theorem). Let all the notations and working assumptions in Section
2 be in force and let Vi be a function from S to R, with i ∈ {1, 2}. Assume that (3.1) holds and
set Di :={MiVi − Vi < 0}, with MiVi as in (3.2). Moreover, for i∈{1, 2} assume that:
(i) Vi is a solution to (3.3a)-(3.3d);
(ii) Vi ∈ C2(Dj \ ∂Di) ∩ C1(Dj) ∩ C(S) and it has polynomial growth;
(iii) ∂Di is a Lipschitz surface (i.e. it is locally the graph of a Lipschitz function), and Vi has
locally bounded derivatives up to the second order in some neighbourhood of ∂Di.
Finally, let x ∈ S and assume that (ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2) ∈ Φx, with
ϕ∗i = (Di, δi),
where i ∈ {1, 2}, the set Di is as above and the function δi is as in (3.1). Then,
(ϕ∗1, ϕ
∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium and Vi(x) = J
i(x;ϕ∗1, ϕ
∗
2) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Remark 3.4. Practically, the Nash strategy is characterized as follows: player i intervenes only if
the controlled process exits from the region {MiVi−Vi < 0} (equivalently, only ifMiVi(x) = Vi(x),
where x is the current state). When this happens, her impulse is δi(x).
Remark 3.5. Some technical steps and approximations in the proof of Theorem 3.3 may hide the
idea on which this result is based: if ϕ1 is a strategy for player 1 such that (ϕ1, ϕ
∗
2) ∈ Φx, by the
Itoˆ formula (here, just heuristically) and the four conditions in the QVI problem (3.3), we get
V1(x) “=” Ex
[
−
∫ τS
0
e−ρ1s(AV1−ρ1V1)(Xs)ds−
∑
τ1,k<τS
e−ρ1τ1,k
(
V1
(
Xτ1,k
)−V1(X(τ1,k)−))
−
∑
τ2,k<τS
e−ρ1τ2,k
(
V1
(
Xτ2,k
)− V1(X(τ2,k)−))+ e−ρ1τSV1(XτS )1{τS<+∞}]
≥ Ex
[ ∫ τS
0
e−ρ1sf1(Xs)ds+
∑
τ1,k<τS
e−ρ1τ1,kφ1
(
X(τ1,k)− , δ1,k
)
+
∑
τ2,k<τS
e−ρ1τ2,kψ1
(
X(τ2,k)− , δ2,k
)
+ e−ρ1τSh1(XτS )1{τS<+∞}
]
= J1(x;ϕ1, ϕ
∗
2).
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When considering ϕ = ϕ∗1, we get an equality by the definition of ϕ
∗
1, so that (ϕ
∗
1, ϕ
∗
2) is Nash
equilibrium. However, several approximating sequences have to be considered, since we cannot
directly apply the Itoˆ formula (V1 is not regular enough) and take expectations (we are dealing
with potentially infinite sums).
Remark 3.6. Notice that, since Vi ∈ C(S) for i ∈ {1, 2}, the sets Di are open and the functions
δi are measurable by the measurable maximum theorem in [1, Thm. 18.19]. We also observe that,
for the (candidate) equilibrium strategies in the theorem above, the properties in Lemma 2.3 imply
what follows (the notation is heavy, but it will be crucial to understand the proof of the theorem):
(M1V1 − V1)
(
X
x;ϕ∗1 ,ϕ2
s
)
< 0, (3.8a)
(M2V2 − V2)
(
X
x;ϕ1,ϕ
∗
2
s
)
< 0, (3.8b)
δ
x;ϕ∗1 ,ϕ2
1,k = δ1
(
X
x;ϕ∗1 ,ϕ2(
τ
x;ϕ∗1 ,ϕ2
1,k
)−), (3.8c)
δ
x;ϕ1,ϕ
∗
2
2,k = δ2
(
X
x;ϕ1,ϕ
∗
2(
τ
x;ϕ1,ϕ
∗
2
2,k
)−), (3.8d)
(M1V1 − V1)
(
X
x;ϕ∗1 ,ϕ2(
τ
x;ϕ∗1 ,ϕ2
1,k
)−) = 0, (3.8e)
(M2V2 − V2)
(
X
x;ϕ1,ϕ
∗
2(
τ
x;ϕ1,ϕ
∗
2
2,k
)−) = 0, (3.8f)
for every strategies ϕ1, ϕ2 such that (ϕ1, ϕ
∗
2), (ϕ
∗
1, ϕ2) ∈ Φx, every s ≥ 0 and every τx;ϕ1,ϕ
∗
2
i,k ,
τ
x;ϕ∗1 ,ϕ2
i,k <∞.
Proof. By Definition 2.6, we have to prove that
Vi(x) = J
i(x;ϕ∗1, ϕ
∗
2), V1(x) ≥ J1(x;ϕ1, ϕ∗2), V2(x) ≥ J2(x;ϕ∗1, ϕ2),
for every i ∈ {1, 2} and (ϕ1, ϕ2) strategies such that (ϕ1, ϕ∗2) ∈ Φx and (ϕ∗1, ϕ2) ∈ Φx. We show
the results for V1 and J
1, the arguments for V2 and J
2 being symmetric.
Step 1: V1(x) ≥ J1(x;ϕ1, ϕ∗2). Let ϕ1 be a strategy for player 1 such that (ϕ1, ϕ∗2) ∈ Φx. Here
we will use the following shortened notation:
X = Xx;ϕ1,ϕ
∗
2 , τi,k = τ
x;ϕ1,ϕ
∗
2
i,k , δi,k = δ
x;ϕ1,ϕ
∗
2
i,k .
In order to use the Itoˆ formula, we first need to approximate V1 with regular functions. Since
(ii) and (iii) hold, by [23, proof of Thm. 10.4.1 and App. D] there exists a sequence of functions
{V1,j}j∈N such that:
(a) V1,j ∈ C2(D2) ∩ C0(S), for each j ∈ N (in particular, AV1,j is well-defined in D2);
(b) V1,j → V1 as j →∞, uniformly on the compact subsets of S;
(c) {AV1,j}j∈N is locally bounded in D2 and AV1,j → AV1 as j →∞, uniformly on the compact
subsets of D2 \ ∂D1.
For each r > 0 and ` ∈ N, we set
τr,` = τr ∧ τ1,` ∧ τ2,`, (3.9)
where τr = inf{s > 0 : Xs /∈ B(0, r)} is the exit time from the ball with radius r. By (3.8b) we have
that Xs ∈ D2 for each s > 0. Since V1,j ∈ C2(D2) by (a), for each j ∈ N we can apply Itoˆ’s formula
to the process e−ρ1tV1,j(Xt) over the interval [0, τr,`[, and take the conditional expectations: we
get
V1,j(x)=Ex
[
−
∫ τr,`
0
e−ρ1s(AV1,j−ρ1V1,j)(Xs)ds−
∑
τ1,k<τr,`
e−ρ1τ1,k
(
V1,j
(
Xτ1,k
)−V1,j(X(τ1,k)−))
−
∑
τ2,k<τr,`
e−ρ1τ2,k
(
V1,j
(
Xτ2,k
)− V1,j(X(τ2,k)−))+ e−ρ1τr,`V1,j(X(τr,`)−)]. (3.10)
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Notice that (3.10) is well-defined by (3.9): indeed, since τr,` ≤ τr, X belongs to the compact set
B(0, r), where the continuous function V1,j is bounded; moreover, the two summations consist
in a finite number of terms since τr,` ≤ τ1,` ∧ τ2,`. Also, notice that in (3.10) we need to write
V1,j(X(τr,`)−), due to the jump at time τr,`. We now pass to the limit in (3.10) as j →∞: since X
belongs to the compact set B(0, r), by the uniform convergence in (b) and (c) we get
V1(x)=Ex
[
−
∫ τr,`
0
e−ρ1s(AV1−ρ1V1)(Xs)ds−
∑
τ1,k<τr,`
e−ρ1τ1,k
(
V1
(
Xτ1,k
)−V1(X(τ1,k)−))
−
∑
τ2,k<τr,`
e−ρ1τ2,k
(
V1
(
Xτ2,k
)− V1(X(τ2,k)−))+ e−ρ1τr,`V1(X(τr,`)−)]. (3.11)
We now estimate each term in the right-hand side of (3.11). As for the first term, since
(M2V2 − V2)(Xs) < 0 by (3.8b), from (3.3d) it follows that
(AV1 − ρ1V1)(Xs) ≤ −f1(Xs), (3.12)
for all s ∈ [0, τS ]. For the second term, let us consider any k ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω with τ1,k(ω) < τS(ω).
By (3.3b) and the definition of M1V1 in (3.2),we have
V1
(
X(τ1,k)−
) ≥M1V1(X(τ1,k)−)
= sup
δ∈Z1
{
V1
(
Γ1
(
X(τ1,k)− , δ
))
+ φ1
(
X(τ1,k)− , δ
)}
≥ V1
(
Γ1
(
X(τ1,k)− , δ1,k
))
+ φ1
(
X(τ1,k)− , δ1,k
)
= V1
(
Xτ1,k
)
+ φ1
(
X(τ1,k)− , δ1,k
)
. (3.13)
As for the third term, let us consider any k ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω with τ2,k(ω) < τS(ω). By (3.8f) we
have (M2V2−V2)
(
X(τ2,k)−
)
= 0; hence, the condition in (3.3c), the definition of H1V1 in (3.2) and
the expression of δ2,k in (3.8d) imply that
V1
(
X(τ2,k)−
)
= H1V1
(
X(τ2,k)−
)
= V1
(
Γ2
(
X(τ2,k)− , δ2
(
X(τ2,k)−)
))
+ ψ1
(
X(τ2,k)− , δ2
(
X(τ2,k)−)
)
= V1
(
Γ2
(
X(τ2,k)− , δ2,k
))
+ ψ1
(
X(τ2,k)− , δ2,k
)
= V1
(
Xτ2,k
)
+ ψ1
(
X(τ2,k)− , δ2,k
)
. (3.14)
By (3.11) and the estimates in (3.12)-(3.14) it follows that
V1(x) ≥ Ex
[ ∫ τr,`
0
e−ρ1sf1(Xs)ds+
∑
τ1,k<τr,`
e−ρ1τ1,kφ1
(
X(τ1,k)− , δ1,k
)
+
∑
τ2,k<τr,`
e−ρ1τ2,kψ1
(
X(τ2,k)− , δ2,k
)
+ e−ρ1τr,`V1
(
X(τr,`)−
)]
.
Thanks to the conditions in (2.7),(2.8) and the polynomial growth of V1 in (ii), we now use the
dominated convergence theorem and pass to the limit, first as r →∞ and then as `→∞, so that
the stopping times τr,` converge to τS by (2.9). In particular, for the fourth term we notice that
by (ii) and (2.8) we have
V1(X(τr,`)−) ≤ C(1 + |X(τr,`)− |p) ≤ C(1 + ‖X‖p∞) ∈ L1(Ω), (3.15)
for suitable constants C > 0 and p ∈ N; the corresponding limit immediately follows by the
continuity of V1 in the case τS <∞ and by (3.15) itself in the case τS =∞ (as a direct consequence
of (2.8), we have ‖X‖p∞ <∞ a.s.). Hence, we finally get
V1(x) ≥ Ex
[ ∫ τS
0
e−ρ1sf1(Xs)ds+
∑
τ1,k<τS
e−ρ1τ1,kφ1
(
X(τ1,k)− , δ1,k
)
+
∑
τ2,k<τS
e−ρ1τ2,kψ1
(
X(τ2,k)− , δ2,k
)
+ e−ρ1τSh1(XτS )1{τS<+∞}
]
= J1(x;ϕ1, ϕ
∗
2).
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Step 2: V1(x) = J
1(x;ϕ∗1, ϕ
∗
2). We argue as in Step 1, but here all the inequalities are equalities
by the properties of ϕ∗1.
As already noticed in Remark 3.1, we stress that, unlike one-player impulse control problems,
in our verification theorem the candidates are not required to be twice differentiable everywhere.
For example, consider the case of player 1: as in the proof we always consider pairs of strategies in
the form (ϕ1, ϕ
∗
2), by (3.8b) the controlled process never exits from D2 = {M2V2−V2 < 0}, which
is then the only region where the function V1 needs to be (almost everywhere) twice differentiable
in order to apply Itoˆ’s formula.
We conclude this section with some considerations on how the theorem above will typically
be used. First, when solving the system of QVIs, one deals with functions which are defined only
piecewise, as it will be clear in the next section. Then, the regularity assumptions in the verification
theorem will give us suitable smooth-pasting conditions, leading to a system of algebraic equations.
If the regularity conditions are too strong, the system has more equations than parameters, making
the application of the theorem more difficult. Hence, a crucial point when stating a verification
theorem is to set regularity conditions giving a solvable system of equations. In Section 4 we show
that, in an example of one-dimensional impulse game, the regularity conditions actually lead to a
well-posed algebraic system.
4 Examples of solvable one-dimensional impulse games
In Sections 4.1-4.4 we provide an application of the Verification Theorem 3.3 to an impulse game
with a one-dimensional state variable modelled by a (scaled) Brownian motion, that can be shifted
due to the interventions of two players with linear payoffs. We find a family of Nash equilibria for
such a game and provide explicit expressions for the payoffs functions and for the optimal strategies
at equilibrium. In Section 4.5 we adapt the solving procedure to two further families of examples,
with cubic payoffs and with linear and cubic payoffs, where a solution is found numerically.
4.1 Formulation of the problem
We consider a one-dimensional real process X and two players with opposite goals: player 1 prefers
a high value for the process X, whereas the goal of player 2 is to force X to take a low value. More
precisely, if x denotes the current value of the process, we assume that the running payoffs of the
two players are given by
f1(x) = x− s1, f2(x) = s2 − x, s1 < s2, (4.1)
where s1, s2 are fixed (possibly negative) constants.
We assume that each player can intervene and shift X from state x to state x + δ, with
δ ∈ R possibly varying in each intervention. Moreover, when none of the players intervenes, we
assume that X follows a (scaled) Brownian motion. Hence, if x denotes the initial state and
ui = {(τi,k, δi,k)}k≥1 collects the intervention times and the corresponding impulses of player
i ∈ {1, 2}, we have
Xs = X
x;u1,u2
s = x+ σWs +
∑
k : τ1,k≤s
δ1,k +
∑
k : τ2,k≤s
δ2,k, s ≥ 0,
where W is a standard one-dimensional Brownian motion and σ > 0 is a fixed parameter.
As player 2 aims at lowering the level, we can assume that her impulses are negative: δ2,k ≤ 0,
for every k ∈ N. Similarly, we assume δ1,k ≥ 0, for every k ∈ N. Affecting the process has a cost
for the intervening player and we also assume that there is a corresponding gain for the opponent.
In our model both intervention penalties and gains consist in a fixed cost and in a variable cost,
assumed to be proportional to the absolute value of the impulse: if φi denotes the intervention
penalty for player i and ψj denotes the corresponding gain for player j, we assume
φi(δ) = −c− λ|δ|, ψj(δ) = c˜+ λ˜|δ|,
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where δ ∈ R is the impulse corresponding to the intervention of player i and c, c˜, λ, λ˜ are fixed
constants such that
c ≥ c˜ ≥ 0, λ ≥ λ˜ ≥ 0, (c, λ) 6= (c˜, λ˜).
The order conditions have this justification: if we had c < c˜ or λ < λ˜, then, for a suitable impulse
δ, the two players could realize a mutual gain by an (almost) instantaneous double intervention;
by iterating this infinitely often in a finite interval, the two payoff functions would diverge (this
phenomenon is analogous to the one already present in [18] for stopping games). The condition
(c, λ) 6= (c˜, λ˜) will be explained in Remark 4.5 and Section 4.4. Finally, we assume
1− λρ > 0, (4.2)
where ρ is the discount rate, the same one for both players.
This problem clearly belongs to the class described in Section 2, with
d = 1, S = R, Γi(x, δ) = x+ δ, ρi = ρ, Z1 = [0,∞[, Z2 =]−∞, 0],
and with fi, φi, ψi as above. In short, if ϕi = (Ci, ξi) denotes the strategy of player i, the objective
functions are
J1(x;ϕ1, ϕ2) :=Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρs(Xs−s1)ds−
∑
k≥1
e−ρτ1,k(c+λ|δ1,k|)+
∑
k≥1
e−ρτ2,k(c˜+λ˜|δ2,k|)
]
,
J2(x;ϕ1, ϕ2) :=Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρs(s2−Xs)ds−
∑
k≥1
e−ρτ2,k(c+λ|δ2,k|)+
∑
k≥1
e−ρτ1,k(c˜+λ˜|δ1,k|)
]
,
where {(τi,k, δi,k)}k≥1 denotes the impulse control of player i associated to the strategies ϕ1, ϕ2.
As already outlined, the players have different goals: we are going to investigate if a Nash
equilibrium for such a problem exists. Indeed, since s1 < s2 both players gain in the interval
[s1, s2], it seems that there is room for a Nash configuration. If a Nash equilibrium exists, we
denote by V1(x), V2(x) the corresponding equilibrium payoffs with initial state x ∈ R.
As a possible interpretation of the game just described, let X denote the exchange rate between
two currencies. The central banks of the corresponding countries (the players) have different targets
for the rate: player 1 prefers a high value for X, while the goal of player 2 is yielding a low value.
To have a tractable model, we assume that the payoffs of the two players are given, respectively, by
X−s1 and s2−X, where s1, s2 are fixed constants with s2 > s1, which leads to the one-dimensional
game defined in this section. This interpretation corresponds to a two-player version of the model
introduced and studied in, e.g., [10] and [12].
4.2 Looking for candidates for the payoff functions at equilibrium
Our goal is to use the Verification Theorem 3.3. We start by looking for a solution to the problem
in (3.3), in order to get a couple of candidates V˜1, V˜2 for the payoff functions V1, V2.
First, consider the two equations in the QVI problem (3.3), that is
HiV˜i − V˜i = 0, in {Mj V˜j − V˜j = 0},
max
{AV˜i − ρV˜i + fi,MiV˜i − V˜i} = 0, in {Mj V˜j − V˜j < 0},
for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, with i 6= j; this suggests the following representation for V˜i:
V˜i(x) =

MiV˜i(x), in {MiV˜i − V˜i = 0},
ϕi(x), in {MiV˜i − V˜i < 0,Mj V˜j − V˜j < 0},
HiV˜i(x), in {Mj V˜j − V˜j = 0},
(4.3)
for i ∈ {1, 2} and x ∈ R, where ϕi is a solution to
Aϕi − ρϕi + fi = σ
2
2
ϕ′′i − ρϕi + fi = 0. (4.4)
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Notice that an explicit formula for ϕi is available: for each x ∈ R, we have
ϕ1(x) = ϕ
A11,A12
1 (x) = A11e
θx +A12e
−θx + (x− s1)/ρ,
ϕ2(x) = ϕ
A21,A22
2 (x) = A21e
θx +A22e
−θx + (s2 − x)/ρ,
(4.5)
where Aij are real parameters and the parameter θ is defined by
θ =
√
2ρ
σ2
.
In order to go on, we need to guess an expression for the intervention regions. As the goal of player
1 is to keep a high value for the process, it is reasonable to assume that her intervention region
is in the form ] −∞, x¯1], for some threshold x¯1. For a similar reason, we expect the intervention
region of player 2 to be in the form [x¯2,+∞[, for some other threshold x¯2. Since s1 < s2, we guess
that x¯1 < x¯2; as a consequence, the real line is heuristically partitioned into three intervals:
]−∞, x¯1] = {M1V˜1 − V˜1 = 0}, where player 1 intervenes,
]x¯1, x¯2[= {M1V˜1 − V˜1 < 0} ∩ {M2V˜2 − V˜2 < 0}, where no one intervenes,
[x¯2,+∞[= {M2V˜2 − V˜2 = 0}, where player 2 intervenes.
By the representation (4.3), this leads to the following expressions for V˜1 and V˜2:
V˜1(x) =

M1V˜1(x), if x ∈ ]−∞, x¯1],
ϕ1(x), if x ∈ ]x¯1, x¯2[,
H1V˜1(x), if x ∈ [x¯2,+∞[,
V˜2(x) =

H2V˜2(x), if x ∈ ]−∞, x¯1],
ϕ2(x), if x ∈ ]x¯1, x¯2[,
M2V˜2(x), if x ∈ [x¯2,+∞[.
Let us now investigate the form ofMiV˜i andHiV˜i. Recall that the impulses of player 1 (resp. player
2) are positive (resp. negative); then, we have
M1V˜1(x) = sup
δ≥0
{V˜1(x+ δ)− c− λδ} = sup
y≥x
{V˜1(y)− c− λ(y − x)},
M2V˜2(x) = sup
δ≤0
{V˜2(x+ δ)− c− λ(−δ)} = sup
y≤x
{V˜2(y)− c− λ(x− y)}.
It is reasonable to assume that the maximum point of the function y 7→ V˜1(y) − λy (resp. y 7→
V˜2(y) + λy) exists, is unique and belongs to the common continuation region ]x¯1, x¯2[, where we
have V˜1 = ϕ1 (resp. V˜2 = ϕ2). As a consequence, if we denote by x
∗
i , i ∈ {1, 2}, such maximum
points, that is
ϕ1(x
∗
1) = max
y∈]x¯1,x¯2[
{ϕ1(y)− λy}, i.e. ϕ′1(x∗1) = λ, ϕ′′1(x∗1) ≤ 0, x¯1<x∗1<x¯2,
ϕ2(x
∗
2) = max
y∈]x¯1,x¯2[
{ϕ2(y) + λy}, i.e. ϕ′2(x∗2) = −λ, ϕ′′2(x∗2) ≤ 0, x¯1<x∗2<x¯2,
the functions MiV˜i, HiV˜i have the following (heuristic, at the moment) expression:
M1V˜1(x) = ϕ1(x∗1)− c− λ(x∗1 − x), M2V˜2(x) = ϕ2(x∗2)− c− λ(x− x∗2),
H1V˜1(x) = ϕ1(x∗2) + c˜+ λ˜(x− x∗2), H2V˜2(x) = ϕ2(x∗1) + c˜+ λ˜(x∗1 − x).
As for the parameters involved in V˜1, V˜2, they must be chosen so as to satisfy the regularity
assumptions in the verification theorem, which here write
V˜1 ∈ C2
(
]−∞, x¯1[ ∪ ]x¯1, x¯2[
) ∩ C1( ]−∞, x¯2[ ) ∩ C(R),
V˜2 ∈ C2
(
]x¯1, x¯2[ ∪ ]x¯2,+∞[
) ∩ C1( ]x¯1,+∞[ ) ∩ C(R).
Since V˜1 and V˜2 are, by definition, smooth in ] −∞, x¯1[ ∪ ]x¯1, x¯2[ ∪ ]x¯2,+∞[, we have to set the
parameters so that V˜i is continuous at x¯1, x¯2 and differentiable at x¯i (we underline that V˜1 and V˜2
might not be differentiable at, respectively, x¯2 and x¯1).
Finally, to summarize all the previous arguments, our candidates for the payoff functions of
some Nash equilibrium are defined as follows.
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Definition 4.1. For every x ∈ R, we set
V˜1(x) =

ϕ1(x
∗
1)− c− λ(x∗1 − x), if x ∈ ]−∞, x¯1],
ϕ1(x), if x ∈ ]x¯1, x¯2[,
ϕ1(x
∗
2) + c˜+ λ˜(x− x∗2), if x ∈ [x¯2,+∞[,
V˜2(x) =

ϕ2(x
∗
1) + c˜+ λ˜(x
∗
1 − x), if x ∈ ]−∞, x¯1],
ϕ2(x), if x ∈ ]x¯1, x¯2[,
ϕ2(x
∗
2)− c− λ(x− x∗2), if x ∈ [x¯2,+∞[,
(4.6)
where ϕ1 = ϕ
A11,A12
1 , ϕ2 = ϕ
A21,A22
2 and the eight parameters involved
(A11, A12, A21, A22, x¯1, x¯2, x
∗
1, x
∗
2)
satisfy the order conditions
x¯1 < x
∗
1 < x¯2, x¯1 < x
∗
2 < x¯2, (4.7)
and the following conditions:
ϕ′1(x
∗
1) = λ and ϕ
′′
1(x
∗
1) ≤ 0, (optimality of x∗1) (4.8a)
ϕ′1(x¯1) = λ, (C
1-pasting in x¯1) (4.8b)
ϕ1(x¯1) = ϕ1(x
∗
1)− c− λ(x∗1 − x¯1), (C0-pasting in x¯1) (4.8c)
ϕ1(x¯2) = ϕ1(x
∗
2) + c˜+ λ˜(x¯2 − x∗2), (C0-pasting in x¯2) (4.8d)
ϕ′2(x
∗
2) = −λ and ϕ′′2(x∗2) ≤ 0, (optimality of x∗2) (4.9a)
ϕ′2(x¯2) = −λ, (C1-pasting in x¯2) (4.9b)
ϕ2(x¯1) = ϕ2(x
∗
1) + c˜+ λ˜(x
∗
1 − x¯1), (C0-pasting in x¯1) (4.9c)
ϕ2(x¯2) = ϕ2(x
∗
2)− c− λ(x¯2 − x∗2). (C0-pasting in x¯2) (4.9d)
In order to have a well-posed definition, we need to show that the conditions in (4.7)-(4.8)-(4.9)
actually admit a solution. Indeed, we can here prove that there exists a family of solutions to (4.7)-
(4.8)-(4.9), i.e., that we have infinitely many (candidates for the) Nash equilibria and corresponding
payoffs.
Proposition 4.2. There exists a family of 8-uples (A11, A12, A21, A22, x¯1, x¯2, x
∗
1, x
∗
2) satisfying the
conditions in (4.7)-(4.8)-(4.9). Moreover, for each of such 8-uples, there exists x˜ ∈]x∗2, x¯2[ such
that ϕ′′2 < 0 in ]x¯1, x˜[ and ϕ
′′
2 > 0 in ]x˜, x¯2[.
Proof. First, we reduce the number of equations. Notice that, for any s˜ ∈ R and x ∈ R, the
running costs (f1, f2) satisfy
f1(x) = f2(2s˜− x) + 2s˜− (s1 + s2).
We guess a corresponding relation for (ϕ1, ϕ2), that is
ϕ1(x) = ϕ2(2s˜− x) + 2s˜− (s1 + s2)
ρ
,
and we look for couples (x¯1, x¯2), (x
∗
1, x
∗
2) symmetric with respect to s˜. Hence, we focus on candi-
dates such that
x¯1 = 2s˜− x¯2, x∗1 = 2s˜− x∗2, A11 = A22e−2θs˜, A12 = A21e2θs˜. (4.10)
Under condition (4.10), the systems in (4.8) and (4.9) are independent and equivalent: namely, the
4-uple (A11, A12, x¯1, x
∗
1) solves (4.8) if and only if (A21, A22, x¯2, x
∗
2), defined by (4.10), is a solution
to (4.9). Hence, we just need to solve one of the two systems of equations: we decide to focus on
(4.9), along with the order condition (4.7). By the change of variable
y¯ = eθ(x¯2−s˜), y∗ = eθ(x
∗
2−s˜), A1 = 2θA21eθs˜, A2 = 2θA22e−θs˜ (4.11)
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and some algebraic manipulations, the conditions in (4.7) and (4.9) read (see Appendix A for the
details, we set η = (1− λρ)/ρ, notice that η > 0)
A1(y
∗)2 − 2ηy∗ −A2 = 0, (4.12a)
A1y¯
2 − 2ηy¯ −A2 = 0, (4.12b)
(A1 +A2)
2(y¯ − y∗) + 2A2
[
θ(c− c˜) + (λ− λ˜) log(y¯/y∗)] = 0, (4.12c)
A1(y¯ − y∗) + θc− η log(y¯/y∗) = 0, (4.12d)
y∗ > 0, y¯ > 0, y∗ < y¯, 1 < y¯y∗, A1y∗ − η ≤ 0. (4.12e)
We now prove that there exists a unique solution (A1, A2, y¯, y
∗) to (4.12). Given a fixed pair
(A1, A2) ∈ A, where
A = {(A1, A2) : A1 > 0, A2 < 0, A1 +A2 < 0, η2 +A1A2 > 0}, (4.13)
there exists a unique solution to (4.12a)-(4.12b)-(4.12e), given by
y¯(A1, A2) =
η +
√
η2 +A1A2
A1
, y∗(A1, A2) =
η −
√
η2 +A1A2
A1
. (4.14)
To conclude, we just need to prove that there exists a unique pair (A1, A2) such that
(A1, A2) ∈ A and
(
A1, A2, y¯(A1, A2), y
∗(A1, A2)
)
is a solution to (4.12c)-(4.12d), (4.15)
that is, by the expressions in (4.14), such that
(A1 +A2)
2
√
η2 +A1A2 +A1A2
[
θ(c− c˜) + (λ− λ˜) log
(
η +
√
η2 +A1A2
η −
√
η2 +A1A2
)]
= 0, (4.16a)
2
√
η2 +A1A2 + θc− η log
(
η +
√
η2 +A1A2
η −
√
η2 +A1A2
)
= 0, (4.16b)
A1 > 0, A2 < 0, A1 +A2 < 0, η
2 +A1A2 > 0. (4.16c)
Namely, (4.16a)-(4.16b) correspond to (4.12c)-(4.12d), whereas the inequalities in (4.16c) corre-
spond to the condition (A1, A2) ∈ A.
For x ∈ (0, η), define the function
F (x) = 2x+ θc− η log
(
η + x
η − x
)
. (4.17)
Since F (0+) = θc > 0, F (η−) = −∞ and F ′ < 0, there exists a unique ξ ∈ (0, η) such that
F (ξ) = 0. Consequently, (4.16) is equivalent to (see Appendix A for the details)
A1A2 = −M,
A1 +A2 = −2N,
A1 > 0, A2 < 0,
with M = η2 − ξ2 and N =
√
(η2 − ξ2)[θη(c− c˜) + (λ− λ˜)(2ξ + θc)]
4ηξ
,
(4.18)
which trivially has a unique solution (notice that N2 +M > 0), namely
A1 = −N +
√
N2 +M, A2 = −N −
√
N2 +M. (4.19)
Finally, it is immediate to see that ϕ′′2 < 0 in ] −∞, x˜[ and ϕ′′2 > 0 in ]x˜,+∞[, for a suitable
x˜ ∈ R. By the change of variable, ϕ′′2(x¯2) > 0 (resp. ϕ′′2(x∗2) < 0) if and only if A1y¯ − η > 0
(resp. A1y
∗ − η < 0), which is trivially true; hence, x˜ ∈]x∗2, x¯2[.
Remark 4.3. From the proof of Proposition 4.2, we see that the system in (4.9) has more than
one solution, but only one satisfies the order condition (4.7). In particular, we notice that the other
solution of (4.9) corresponds to A˜1 = −A2, A˜2 = −A1, y˜∗ = 1/y¯, ˜¯y = 1/y∗.
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Remark 4.4. There are infinitely many solution to the system (4.7)-(4.8)-(4.9), indexed by the
parameter s˜ ∈ R. To simplify the notation, we will often omit the dependence on such a parameter
and write, for example, x¯i instead of x¯i(s˜). By combining (4.10), (4.11), (4.14) and (4.19), we
can get (semi-)explicit formulas for the 8-uples (A11, A12, A21, A22, x¯1, x¯2, x
∗
1, x
∗
2) which solve (4.7)-
(4.8)-(4.9): namely, for any s˜ ∈ R we have
x¯i = s˜+
(−1)i
θ
log
[√
η + ξ
η − ξ
(√
Γ + 1 +
√
Γ
)]
,
x∗i = s˜+
(−1)i
θ
log
[√
η − ξ
η + ξ
(√
Γ + 1 +
√
Γ
)]
,
Aij = e
(−1)jθs˜
√
η2 − ξ2
2θ
(
(−1)i+j+1√Γ + 1−
√
Γ
)
,
(4.20)
for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, where ξ = ξ(c, θ, η) ∈ (0, η) is the unique zero of the function F in (4.17) and the
coefficients are defined by
θ =
√
2ρ
σ2
, η =
1− λρ
ρ
, Γ =
θ(c− c˜)
4ξ
+
θc(λ− λ˜)
4ηξ
+
λ− λ˜
2η
. (4.21)
Also, notice that (4.10) implies that
V1(x) = V2(2s˜− x) + 2s˜− (s1 + s2)
ρ
, (4.22)
for x ∈ R. In particular, when s˜ = (s1 + s2)/2 the functions V˜i are symmetric with respect to s˜.
Remark 4.5. Let i, j∈{1, 2}, with i 6=j. From (4.20), we notice that x¯i = x∗j when Γ = 0, which
happens if and only if (c, λ) = (c˜, λ˜). This situation gives rise to a degenerate solution, where
players intervene infinitely often in each instant. We analyze this in more detail in Section 4.4,
where we study the case where λ = λ˜ and c→ c˜+.
4.3 Application of the verification theorem
We now apply the Verification Theorem 3.3 and prove that the candidates V˜1, V˜2 in Definition 4.1
actually coincide with the payoff functions V1, V2 of the problem described in Section 4.1. We refer
the reader to Section 3.1 for the definition of the functions δ1, δ2,M1,M2 used in the following
lemma.
Lemma 4.6. Let V˜1, V˜2 be as in Definition 4.1. For every x ∈ R we have
δ1(x) =
{
x∗1 − x, in ]−∞, x∗1],
0, in ]x∗1,+∞[,
δ2(x) =
{
0, in ]−∞, x∗2[,
x∗2 − x, in [x∗2,+∞[.
(4.23)
Moreover, we have
M1V˜1 − V˜1 ≤ 0, {M1V˜1 − V˜1 < 0} = ]x¯1,+∞[, {M1V˜1 − V˜1 = 0} = ]−∞, x¯1],
M2V˜2 − V˜2 ≤ 0, {M2V˜2 − V˜2 < 0} = ]−∞, x¯2[, {M2V˜2 − V˜2 = 0} = [x¯2,+∞[.
(4.24)
Proof. We give the proof only for δ2 and M2V˜2, the arguments for δ1 and M1V˜1 being the same.
For every x ∈ R, we have
M2V˜2(x)=max
δ2≤0
{V˜2(x+δ2)−c−λ(−δ2)}=max
y≤x
{V˜2(y)−c−λ(x−y)}=max
y≤x
{Γ2(y)}−c−λx, (4.25)
where for each y ∈ R we have set
Γ2(y) = V˜2(y) + λy.
By the definition of V˜2, we have Γ
′
2(x
∗
2) = Γ
′
2(x¯2) = 0. Moreover, we notice that:
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- Γ′2 = λ− λ˜ ≥ 0 in ]−∞, x¯1[, by the definition of V˜2;
- Γ′2 > 0 in ]x¯1, x
∗
2[, as Γ
′
2(x
∗
2) = 0 and Γ
′
2 is decreasing in ]x¯1, x
∗
2[ (since, by Proposition 4.2,
we have Γ′′2 = ϕ
′′
2 < 0 in ]x¯1, x
∗
2[);
- Γ′2 < 0 in ]x
∗
2, x¯2[, as Γ
′
2(x
∗
2) = Γ
′
2(x¯2) = 0 and, in the interval ]x
∗
2, x¯2[, Γ
′
2 is first decreasing
and then increasing (since, by Proposition 4.2, Γ′′2 = ϕ
′′
2 is negative in ]x
∗
2, x˜[ and positive in
]x˜, x¯2[);
- Γ′2 = 0 in ]x¯2,+∞[, by the definition of V˜2.
As a consequence, the function Γ2 has a unique global maximum point in x
∗
2, so that
max
y≤x
Γ2(y) =
{
Γ2(x), in ]−∞, x∗2],
Γ2(x
∗
2), in ]x
∗
2,+∞[;
therefore, by the computations in (4.25), we have
M2V˜2(x) =
{
V˜2(x)− c, in ]−∞, x∗2],
ϕ2(x
∗
2)− c− λ(x− x∗2), in ]x∗2,+∞[,
as V˜2(x
∗
2)=ϕ2(x
∗
2), since x
∗
2 ∈]x¯1, x¯2[. By the definition of V˜2, this can be written as
M2V˜2(x) =
{
V˜2(x)− ξ2(x), in ]−∞, x¯2[,
V˜2(x), in [x¯2,+∞[,
where, for each x ∈]−∞, x¯2[, we have set
ξ2(x) =
{
c, in ]−∞, x∗2[,
ϕ2(x)− ϕ2(x∗2) + c+ λ(x− x∗2), in [x∗2, x¯2[.
Let us prove that ξ2 > 0. Recall by (4.9) that ϕ2(x¯2) = ϕ2(x
∗
2)−c−λ(x¯2−x∗2). Then, if x ∈ [x∗2, x¯2[
we have that
ϕ2(x)− ϕ2(x∗2) + c+ λ(x− x∗2) = ϕ2(x)− ϕ2(x¯2)− λ(x¯2 − x) = Γ2(x)− Γ2(x¯2) > 0,
as Γ2 is decreasing in [x
∗
2, x¯2[. Hence, ξ2 is strictly positive, so that (4.24) holds. Finally, by the
previous arguments it is clear that
arg max
δ2≤0
{V˜2(x+ δ2)− c− λ|δ2|} =
{
{0}, in ]−∞, x∗2[,
{x∗2 − x}, in ]x∗2,+∞[,
which implies (4.23).
Proposition 4.7. For s˜ ∈ R, let x∗i = x∗i (s˜) and x¯i = x¯i(s˜), with i ∈ {1, 2}, as in Definition 4.1.
Then, a Nash equilibrium for the problem in Section 4.1 is given by the strategies (C∗1 , ξ∗1), (C∗2 , ξ∗2)
defined by
C∗1 = ]x¯1, +∞[, ξ∗1(y) = x∗1 − y,
C∗2 = ]−∞, x¯2[, ξ∗2(y) = x∗2 − y,
with y ∈ R. Moreover, the functions V˜1, V˜2 in Definition 4.1 coincide with the equilibrium payoff
functions V1, V2:
V1 ≡ V˜1 and V2 ≡ V˜2.
Remark 4.8. We underline that (C∗1 , ξ∗1), (C∗2 , ξ∗2) depends on the free parameter s˜, i.e., C∗i = C∗i (s˜)
and ξ∗i = ξ
∗
i (· ; s˜) (we often omit to underline the dependence to simplify the notations). In
particular, there exist infinitely many Nash equilibria, indexed by the parameter s˜ ∈ R. Notice that
the corresponding optimal intervention regions and intervention functions consist in the translations
of a fixed interval: C∗i (s˜) = s˜+ C∗i (0) and ξ∗i (· ; s˜) = s˜+ ξ∗i (· ; 0), for any s ∈ R.
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Remark 4.9. Recall the practical characterization of the strategy: if x is the current state of the
process, player 1 (resp. player 2) intervenes when x ≤ x¯1 (resp. x ≥ x¯2) and moves the process to
the new state x∗1 (resp. x
∗
2).
Proof. We have to check that the candidates V˜1, V˜2 satisfy all the assumptions of Theorem 3.3.
We prove the claim for V˜2, the arguments for V˜1 being the same. For the reader’s convenience, we
briefly report the conditions we have to check:
(i) V˜2 ∈ C2(]x¯1,+∞[\{x¯2}) ∩ C1(]x¯1,+∞[) ∩ C(R) and has polynomial growth;
(ii) M2V˜2 − V˜2 ≤ 0;
(iii) in {M1V˜1 − V˜1 = 0} we have V˜2 = H2V˜2;
(iv) in {M1V˜1 − V˜1 < 0} we have max
{AV˜2 − ρV˜2 + f2,M2V˜2 − V˜2} = 0;
(v) the equilibrium strategies are x-admissible (see Definition 2.5) for every x ∈ R.
Condition (i) and (ii). The first condition holds by the definition of V˜2, whereas the second
condition has been proved in (4.24).
Condition (iii). Let x ∈ {M1V˜1 − V˜1 = 0} =]−∞, x¯1]. By the definition of H2V˜2 in (3.2), by
(4.23) and by the definition of V˜2 we have
H2V˜2(x) = V˜2(x+ δ1(x)) + c˜+ λ˜|δ1(x)| = V˜2(x∗1) + c˜+ λ˜(x∗1 − x) = V˜2(x),
where we have used that V˜2(x
∗
1) = ϕ2(x
∗
1), since x
∗
1 ∈]x¯1, x¯2[.
Condition (iv). We have to prove that
max
{AV˜2 − ρV˜2 + f2,M2V˜2 − V˜2} = 0, in {M1V˜1 − V˜1 < 0} =]x¯1,+∞[.
In ]x¯1, x¯2[ the claim is true, as M2V˜2 − V˜2 < 0 by (4.24) and AV˜2 − ρV˜2 + f2 = 0 by definition (in
]x¯1, x¯2[ we have V˜2 = ϕ2, which is a solution to the ODE (4.4)). In [x¯2,∞[ we already know by
(4.24) that M2V˜2 − V˜2 = 0. Then, to conclude we have to check that
AV˜2(x)− ρV˜2(x) + f2(x) ≤ 0, ∀x ∈ [x¯2,∞[.
As V˜2(x) = ϕ2(x
∗
2)− c− λ(x− x∗2) by the definition of V˜2(x), the inequality can be written as
−ρ(ϕ2(x∗2)− c− λ(x− x∗2))+ f2(x) ≤ 0, ∀x ∈ [x¯2,∞[.
Since ϕ2(x¯2) = ϕ2(x
∗
2)− c− λ(x¯2 − x∗2) by (4.9), we can rewrite the claim as
−ρ(ϕ2(x¯2)− λ(x− x¯2))+ f2(x) ≤ 0, ∀x ∈ [x¯2,∞[.
The function x 7→ λρx+ f2(x) = (λρ−1)x+ s2 is decreasing, hence it is enough to prove the claim
in x = x¯2:
−ρϕ2(x¯2) + f2(x¯2) ≤ 0.
Since Aϕ2(x¯2)− ρϕ2(x¯2) + f2(x¯2) = 0, we can rewrite as
−σ
2
2
ϕ′′2(x¯2) ≤ 0,
which is true since ϕ′′2(x¯2) ≥ 0 by Proposition 4.2.
Condition (v). Let x be the initial state of the process. By construction the controlled process
never exits from ]x¯1, x¯2[ ∪{x}, so that condition (2.8) holds. It is easy to check that all the other
conditions of Definition 2.5 are satisfied. The only non-trivial proof is the integrability of the
intervention costs: let us prove that for i ∈ {1, 2} we have (the result for c˜, λ˜ immediately follows,
as λ˜ < λ and c˜ < c)
Ex
[∑
k≥1
e−ρτ
∗
i,k(c+ λ|δ∗i,k|)
]
<∞, (4.26)
where {τ∗i,k, δ∗i,k}k are the controls corresponding to the equilibrium strategies.
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To start, let us assume that the initial state x is either x∗1 or x
∗
2. We here consider x = x
∗
1, the
arguments are the same in the case x = x∗2. Since player i shifts the process to x
∗
i when the state
x¯i is hit, the idea is to write τ
∗
i,k as a sum of independent exit times. First of all, we re-label the
indexes and write {τ∗i,k}i,k as {σj}j , with σj < σj+1 for every j ∈ N. Denote by µi the exit time
of the process x∗i + σW from ]x¯1, x¯2[, where W is a real Brownian motion; then, each time σj can
be written as σj =
∑j
l=1 ζl, where the ζl are independent variables which are distributed either as
µ1 or as µ2. We can now estimate (4.26). As δ
∗
i,k ∈ {x¯2 − x∗2, x∗1 − x¯1}, we have
Ex∗1
[ ∑
i∈{1,2}
∑
k≥1
e−ρτ
∗
i,k(c+ λ|δ∗i,k|)
]
≤ (c+ λmax{x¯2 − x∗2, x∗1 − x¯1})Ex∗1
[ ∑
i∈{1,2}
∑
k≥1
e−ρτ
∗
i,k
]
.
By the definition of {σj}j and the decomposition of σj ,
Ex∗1
[ ∑
i∈{1,2}
∑
k≥1
e−ρτ
∗
i,k
]
=Ex∗1
[∑
j≥1
e−ρσj
]
=Ex∗1
[∑
j≥1
e−ρ
∑j
l=1 ζl
]
=Ex∗1
[∑
j≥1
∏
l=1,...,j
e−ρζl
]
.
By the Fubini-Tonelli theorem and the independence of the variables ζj , we get
Ex∗1
[∑
j≥1
∏
l=1,...,j
e−ρζl
]
=
∑
j≥1
∏
l=1,...,j
Ex∗1 [e
−ρζl ] ≤
∑
j≥1
(
Ex∗1 [e
−ρmin{µ1,µ2}]
)j
,
which is a converging geometric series, since µ1, µ2 > 0 (µi is strictly positive since x¯1 < x
∗
i < x¯2).
To sum up, we have shown
Ex∗1
[ ∑
i∈{1,2}
∑
k≥1
e−ρτ
∗
i,k(max{c, c˜}+ λ|δ∗i,k|)
]
<∞,
which clearly implies (4.26). The general case with initial state x ∈ R can be treated similarly: we
have σj = η +
∑j
l=1 ζl, where η is the exit time of x+ σW from [x¯1, x¯2], and the argument can be
easily adapted.
4.4 Comments and some limit properties
In order to understand the qualitative behaviour of the Nash equilibria described in the previous
section, we here study some asymptotic properties of the corresponding continuation regions and
payoff functions. First, we recall some formulas from the previous sections, for reader’s convenience.
The payoff functions of some of the Nash equilibria described before are
V2(x) =

ϕA21,A222 (x
∗
1) + c˜+ λ˜(x
∗
1 − x), if x ∈ ]−∞, x¯1],
ϕA21,A222 (x), if x ∈ ]x¯1, x¯2[,
ϕA21,A222 (x
∗
2)− c− λ(x− x∗2), if x ∈ [x¯2,+∞[,
V1(x)=V2(2s˜−x) + 2s˜−(s1+s2)
ρ
,
(4.27)
where the function ϕA21,A222 is defined in (4.5) and the parameters x¯i, x
∗
i , Aij are defined in (4.20).
In particular, we recall the symmetry relations:
x¯1 = 2s˜− x¯2, x∗1 = 2s˜− x∗2.
Also, recall that player 1 (resp. player 2) intervenes if the state is smaller than x¯1 (resp. greater
than x¯2) and moves the process to x
∗
1 (resp. x
∗
2).
Finally we remark that the parameter ξ = ξ(c, θ, η), defined as the unique zero of the function
F in (4.17), satisfies the following properties: for given parameters θ and η, the function c 7→
ξ(c, θ, η) =: ξ(c) belongs to C∞(]0,∞[) and we have
ξ′(c) =
θ
2
η2 − ξ2(c)
ξ2(c)
, ξ′′(c) = −θη2 ξ
′(c)
ξ3(c)
= −θ
2η2
2
η2 − ξ2(c)
ξ5(c)
; (4.28)
in particular, the following limits hold:
lim
c→0+
ξ(c) = lim
c→0+
c
ξ(c)
= lim
c→0+
c ξ′(c) = lim
c→+∞ c(η − ξ(c)) = 0, limc→+∞ ξ(c) = η. (4.29)
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We now focus on the properties of the continuation region ]x¯1, x¯2[ and the target states x
∗
i with
respect to the parameter c. All the other parameters are assumed to be fixed. To underline the
dependence on this parameter, we will write x¯i = x¯i(c), x
∗
i = x
∗
i (c), Aij = Aij(c) and Vi = V
c
i , for
i, j ∈ {1, 2}. For the limits, we will write V 0+i = limc→0+ V ci , x∗i (+∞) = limc→+∞ x∗i (c) and so on.
Limits as c→ 0+. Since we are going to consider the limit c→ 0+ and since by assumption we
need c > c˜, with c˜ fixed, we assume c˜ = 0. If the fixed intervention cost vanishes, that is c→ 0+,
we expect that the players continuously intervene to keep the process in a state which satisfies
both of them (namely s˜, for symmetry reasons): in other words, we expect the continuation region
]x¯1(c), x¯2(c)[ to collapse to the singleton {s˜}, as c → 0+. Practically, if the initially state is x,
either player 1 (if x < s˜) or player 2 (if x > s˜) shifts the process to s˜; from then on, we constantly
have Xs ≡ s˜. As a consequence, we guess that the equilibrium payoff function for player 2 is
V 0
+
2 (x) = Ex
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρs(s2 − s˜)ds− λ(x− s˜)1{x<s˜} + λ˜(s˜− x)1{x>s˜}
]
=
s2 − s˜
ρ
− (λ˜1{x>s˜} + λ1{x<s˜})(x− s˜).
Notice that this limit situation is formally degenerate with respect our framework, in the sense
that it requires singular interventions in continuous time. We now rigorously prove these heuristic
arguments by considering the explicit expression for the intervention region provided in (4.20).
Actually, the limit situation is not as straightforward as it may appear: the parameters λ, λ˜ play
an important role.
Proposition 4.10. Assume c˜ = 0 and λ = λ˜. Then we have, for i ∈ {1, 2} and x ∈ R
x¯i(0
+) = x∗i (0
+) = s˜, V 0
+
1 (x) =
s˜− s1
ρ
+ λ(x− s˜), V 0+2 (x) =
s2 − s˜
ρ
− λ(x− s˜).
Proof. By (4.20) and (4.29) it follows that x¯2(c)→ s˜ as c→ 0+. The same result holds for x¯1 by
symmetry and hence also for x∗i , since x
∗
i ∈]x¯1, x¯2[. Moreover, again by (4.20) and (4.29), we get
A21(0
+) = e−θs˜
η
2θ
, A22(0
+) = −eθs˜ η
2θ
;
hence, by the first part of the proof, for each x ∈ R we have (recall that λ = λ˜)
V 0
+
2 (x) = ϕ
A21(0
+),A22(0
+)
2 (s˜)− λ(x− s˜) =
s2 − s˜
ρ
− λ(x− s˜).
The corresponding result for V1 follows by symmetry.
Proposition 4.11. Assume c˜ = 0 and λ > λ˜. Then we have
x¯1(0
+) = x∗1(0
+) = s˜−ζ < s˜+ζ = x∗2(0+) = x¯2(0+), ζ =
1
θ
log
√λ− λ˜
2η
+ 1 +
√
λ− λ˜
2η
 > 0.
Proof. The result immediately follows by (4.20) and (4.29).
The case λ = λ˜ corresponds to the intuition above, with x¯i(0
+) = x∗i (0
+) = s˜, for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Conversely, in the case λ > λ˜ we get x¯1(0
+) = x∗1(0
+) and x¯2(0
+) = x∗2(0
+), but the two values,
quite surprisingly, do not coincide. We remark that we here have a non-trivial mutual continuation
region ]x¯1, x¯2[ = ]s˜ − ζ, s˜ + ζ[. Practically, when the process exits from such a region, one of the
players moves the process to one of the two boundaries, then she continuously intervenes to keep
the process in that state, until the Brownian motion points inwards the continuation region. Then,
the game goes on.
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Limits as c→ +∞. If the intervention cost increases, the players rarely intervene. In the limit
case c → +∞, they never intervene and we expect ]x¯1(c), x¯2(c)[ to coincide with R. Correspond-
ingly, the state variable diffuses without being affected by the players, that is Xs = x + σWs, for
each s ≥ 0. As a consequence, we guess that the equilibrium payoff function for player 2 is
V +∞2 (x) = Ex
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρs(s2 − x− σWs)ds
]
=
s2 − x
ρ
.
Moreover, the intervening player clearly compensates the cost c+ λ|x∗i − x| by moving the process
to a state where her payoff is bigger than the opponent’s one. In the case c→ +∞, the intervening
player has to compensate diverging costs, so that we guess that x∗i (c) diverges too. We now
rigorously prove our guesses.
Proposition 4.12. The following limits hold:
x¯2(+∞) = x∗1(+∞) = +∞, x¯1(+∞) = x∗2(+∞) = −∞,
V +∞1 (x) =
x− s1
ρ
, V +∞2 (x) =
s2 − x
ρ
.
Proof. By (4.20) and (4.29) it easily follows that x¯2(+∞) = +∞ and x∗2(+∞) = −∞. By symme-
try, corresponding results hold for x¯1, x
∗
1. Moreover, by (4.20) and (4.29) we get
A21(+∞) = A21(+∞) = 0;
hence, by the first part of this proof, for each x ∈ R we have
V +∞2 (x) = ϕ
A21(+∞),A22(+∞)
2 (x) =
s2 − x
ρ
.
The corresponding result for V1 follows by symmetry.
Monotonicity of x¯i, x
∗
i . If the intervention cost c increases, we expect the common continuation
region ]x¯1(c), x¯2(c)[ to enlarge, since the players are less willing to intervene. Proposition 4.13 makes
this guess rigorous.
Proposition 4.13. The function c 7→ x¯2(c), with c ∈]c˜,+∞[, is increasing and the function
c 7→ x¯1(c) is decreasing.
Proof. Let us prove that c 7→ x¯2(c), with c ∈]c˜,+∞[, is increasing. By (4.20) it suffices to check
that
c 7→ η + ξ(c)
η − ξ(c)
(
θ(λ− λ˜+ η)
4η
c
ξ(c)
− θc˜
4
1
ξ(c)
+
λ− λ˜
2η
)
is an increasing function. Since ξ′ > 0, a sufficient condition is that
c 7→ c
ξ(c)
, c > c˜,
is increasing, that is
H(c) = ξ(c)− cξ′(c) ≥ 0, ∀c > c˜,
which is true since by (4.29) we have H(c˜+) = 0 (consider separately the cases c˜ = 0 and c˜ > 0)
and H ′(c) > 0. The result for x¯1(c) follows by symmetry.
As for the monotonicity of x∗i , it is not easy to make a guess. The formulas in (4.20) do not
allow easy estimates; however, a monotonicity result can be proved in the case c˜ = 0. We will see
later by some numerical simulations that in the general case the function x∗i is not monotone.
Proposition 4.14. Assume c˜ = 0. Then, the function c 7→ x∗2(c), with c ∈]0,+∞[, is decreasing
and the function c 7→ x∗1(c) is increasing. Moreover, we have x∗2 < s˜ < x∗1 for each c > 0.
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Proof. Let us prove that c 7→ x∗2(c), with c ∈]0,+∞[, is decreasing. By (4.20) it suffices to prove
that
c 7→ θ(λ− λ˜+ η)
4η
c(η − ξ(c))
ξ(c)(η + ξ(c))
+
λ− λ˜
2η
η − ξ(c)
η + ξ(c)
is a decreasing function. Since ξ′ > 0, a sufficient condition is that
c 7→ c(η − ξ(c))
ξ(c)(η + ξ(c))
is decreasing, that is
K(c) = ξ(c)− θ
2
c(η2 − ξ2(c))
ξ2(c)
− θη c
ξ(c)
≤ 0, ∀c > 0,
which is true since by (4.29) we have K(0+) = 0 and K ′(c) < 0. The results for x∗1(c) follows by
symmetry. Finally, we get the inequalities by (x∗2)
′ < 0 < (x∗1)
′ and x∗1(0
+) = x∗2(0
+) = s˜.
Limits as c → c˜+. We conclude this section with the behaviour as c → c˜+ in the case λ = λ˜,
i.e. when each intervention practically becomes a transfer of money from the intervening player to
the opponent. It is not easy to guess what happens in this case and the result is quite surprising:
the limiting strategies are not admissible.
Proposition 4.15. Assume λ = λ˜. For i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j, the following limits hold:
x¯i(c˜
+) = x∗j (c˜
+) = s˜+
(−1)i
2θ
log
(
η + ξ(c˜)
η − ξ(c˜)
)
.
Proof. The result immediately follows by (4.20) and (4.29).
Essentially, the limit situation is as follows. Let i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j; as soon as the process
reaches x¯i, player i moves the process to x
∗
i = x¯j , which is the boundary of the intervention region
of player j, who moves the process back to x¯i, thus causing another intervention by player i and
so on. We get a infinite sequence of simultaneous interventions, meaning that these strategies are
not admissible.
Numerical simulations. Here, we present the results (obtained with Wolfram Mathematica)
of some numerical simulations on the game we have described. We focus on player 2 and consider
the following two sets of parameters:
Problem 1: ρ = 0.02, σ = 0.15, s1 = −3, s2 = 3, c˜ = 0, λ = λ˜ = 15.
Problem 2: ρ = 0.02, σ = 0.15, s1 = −3, s2 = 3, c˜ = 50, λ = λ˜ = 0.
We here consider the Nash equilibrium corresponding to s˜ = (s1 + s2)/2 = 0.
Figure 4.1 represents the equilibrium payoff function x 7→ V c2 (x) for Problem 1 and c = 100
(the dashed lines correspond to the three components of the function). Similarly, in Figure 4.2 we
plot the function x 7→ V c2 (x) for Problem 2 and c = 100. In both cases, we notice the C1-pasting
in x¯2, whereas, as noticed in Section 2, the functions are not differentiable in x¯1. Also, when λ is
non-zero, the function is unbounded.
Figure 4.3 (for Problem 1, with c ∈ ]c˜,∞[ = ]0,∞[) and Figure 4.4 (for Problem 2, with c ∈
]c˜,∞[ = ]50,∞[) show the continuation region and the target states: namely, we plot c 7→ x¯1(c)
(solid blue line), x¯2(c) (solid green line), x
∗
1(c) (dashed blue line) and x
∗
2(c) (dashed green line).
As proved above, the continuation region enlarges as c grows and diverges as c → ∞. Consider
the limit case c → c˜+: if c˜ = 0, the four parameters converge to the same state s˜; conversely,
in the case c˜ > 0, we see that x∗1 (resp. x
∗
2) converges to x¯2 (resp. x¯1), which corresponds to an
inadmissible game. Also, we notice that x∗1 (resp. x
∗
2) is decreasing (resp. increasing) when c˜ = 0,
whereas such functions are not monotone in the c˜ > 0 case.
We finally consider Problem 1 and the evolution of x 7→ V c2 (x) as c grows: Figure 4.5 corresponds
to c = 0, Figure 4.6 to c = 250, Figure 4.7 to c = 500. The equilibrium payoff function is a straight
line in the limit case c → 0+, then a bell-shaped curve appears; as c grows, the local maximum
moves to the left and the right side of the bell resembles more and more a straight line with slope
1/ρ, which is actually the limit as c→ +∞.
23
-4 -2 0 2 4
50
100
150
200
250
Figure 4.1: x 7→ V c2 (x) for Pr. 1 and c = 100
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Figure 4.2: x 7→ V c2 (x) for Pr. 2 and c = 100
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Figure 4.3: c 7→ x¯i(c), x∗i (c) for Problem 1
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Figure 4.4: c 7→ x¯i(c), x∗i (c) for Problem 2
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Figure 4.5: Prob. 1, c = 0
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Figure 4.6: Prob. 1, c = 250
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Figure 4.7: Prob. 1, c = 500
Remark 4.16. Recall that the family of Nash equilibria in Proposition 4.7 is parametrized by
s˜ ∈ R. In this section, we have focused on the properties of V1, V2 with respect to the cost parameter
c > 0, assuming a fixed value for s˜. By the formulas in Remark 4.4, we also get some properties
for the equilibrium payoff functions in the case where s˜ varies and the other parameters are fixed.
To underline the dependence on s˜, we now write x¯i = x¯i(s˜) and Vi = V
s˜
i . As s˜ ∈ R increases,
by (4.20) the common continuation region ]x¯1(s˜), x¯2(s˜)[ moves to the right, which corresponds to
smaller values for Player 2, since f2 is decreasing. Indeed, it is easy to see from Definition 4.1 and
(4.20) that for any x ∈ R the function s˜ 7→ V s˜2 (x) is decreasing, with limits V +∞2 (x) = −∞ and
V −∞2 (x) = +∞. Similar results hold for V s˜1 .
4.5 Further examples
The arguments in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 can be easily adapted to other problems: we here provide
some further examples. Clearly, in most cases one has to deal with the full 8-equation system (4.7)-
(4.8)-(4.9) (the decoupling technique in Proposition 4.2 is only possible with symmetric payoffs)
and the solution has to be found numerically.
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Cubic payoffs. Let us consider the same setting as in Section 4.1, now with cubic payoffs:
namely, we substitute (4.1) with
f˜1(x) = c1(x− s1)3, f˜2(x) = (s2 − x)3, s1 < s2,
for x ∈ R, where c1 is a strictly positive constant.
To find an expression for the Nash equilibrium, we follow the procedure introduced in the
previous sections, as follows. First, we solve (4.4), with fi substituted by f˜i: for x ∈ R, the
solutions are given by
ϕ˜1(x) = A11e
θx +A12e
−θx +
c1
ρ
(x− s1)3 + 3c1σ
2
ρ2
(x− s1),
ϕ˜2(x) = A21e
θx +A22e
−θx +
1
ρ
(s2 − x)3 + 3σ
2
ρ2
(s2 − x).
Then, by the same arguments as in Section 4.2, a pair of (candidate) equilibrium payoff functions
is given by (4.6), with ϕ1, ϕ2 substituted by ϕ˜1, ϕ˜2. In order to have a well-posed definition, we
have to find a solution (Aij , x¯i, x
∗
i )i,j∈{1,2} to the 8-equation system (4.7)-(4.8)-(4.9). If c1 = 1, we
can apply the symmetry argument in the proof of Proposition 4.2 and consider a reduced system
with four equations. In general, however, we need to deal with the full 8-equation system. In both
cases, the solution has to be found numerically. Finally, given a solution to (4.7)-(4.8)-(4.9), we
have to verify that the candidates actually satisfy all the assumptions of the Verification Theorem
3.3. We proceed as in Section 4.3: the only difference occurs when verifying that
−ρ(ϕ˜1(x¯1)− λ(x¯1 − x))+ f˜1(x) ≤ 0, ∀x ∈ [−∞, x¯1[,
−ρ(ϕ˜2(x¯2)− λ(x− x¯2))+ f˜2(x) ≤ 0, ∀x ∈ [x¯2,∞[. (4.30)
Indeed, here we cannot use the monotonicity argument in the proof of Proposition 4.7, so that
(4.30) has to be checked numerically. Provided that (4.30) holds, we can then conclude that a
Nash equilibrium exists: player 1 (resp. player 2) intervenes when the state variable exits from
]x¯1,+∞[ (resp. ]−∞, x¯2[) and shifts the process to x∗1 (resp. x∗2).
As an example, we consider the following values:
ρ = 0.1, σ = 0.2, c = 60, c˜ = 20, λ = λ˜ = 5, s1 = −3, s2 = 3, c1 = 1.2.
A solution to (4.7)-(4.8)-(4.9), which also satisfies (4.30), is numerically given by
A11 = −104.943, A12 = 12.965, A21 = 24.669, A22 = −56, 001,
x∗1 = 0.186, x
∗
2 = −0.453, x¯1 = −0.732, x¯2 = 0.464.
Notice that the continuation region ]x¯1, x¯2[ is closer to s1 than to s2, which is reasonable: since
c1 > 1, player 1 experiences higher gains and losses if compared to player 2, so that she is more
willing to intervene than her opponent, which practically translates into |x¯1 − s1| < |x¯2 − s2|.
Linear and cubic payoffs. Let us consider the same setting as in Section 4.1, but now player
1 has a cubic payoff and player 2 has a linear payoff: namely, we substitute (4.1) with
fˆ1(x) = c1(x− s1)3, fˆ2(x) = s2 − x, s1 < s2,
for x ∈ R, where c1 is a strictly positive constant.
As above, a pair of candidate equilibrium payoff functions is given by (4.6), with ϕ1, ϕ2 substi-
tuted by
ϕˆ1(x) = A11e
θx +A12e
−θx +
c1
ρ
(x− s1)3 + 3c1σ
2
ρ2
(x− s1),
ϕˆ2(x) = A21e
θx +A22e
−θx +
1
ρ
(s2 − x).
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Provided that a solution (Aij , x¯i, x
∗
i )i,j∈{1,2} to the systems (4.7)-(4.8)-(4.9) exists (with ϕ1, ϕ2
substituted by ϕˆ1, ϕˆ2), and that
−ρ(ϕˆ1(x¯1)− λ(x¯1 − x))+ fˆ1(x) ≤ 0, ∀x ∈ [−∞, x¯1[, (4.31)
then a Nash equilibrium exists and is described as in the previous example. Notice that in (4.31)
we do not need a sign condition for player 2, since this is implied by (4.2), as in the proof of
Proposition 4.7.
As an example, we consider the following values:
ρ = 0.1, σ = 0.2, c = 10, c˜ = 50, λ = λ˜ = 0, s1 = −0.5, s2 = 0.5, c1 = 1.
A solution to (4.7)-(4.8)-(4.9), which also satisfies (4.31), is numerically given by
A11 = −4.886, A12 = 0.739, A21 = 0.418, A22 = −0.713,
x∗1 = 0.752, x
∗
2 = −0.814, x¯1 = −1.319, x¯2 = 1.053.
For the same reasons as above, we remark that ]x¯1, x¯2[ is closer to s1 than to s2.
Remark 4.17. For the sake of simplicity, in this section we have kept the same dynamics as in
the previous section, when none of the players intervenes, that is dXs = σdWs. However, different
equations could be considered, as this would only affect the definition of the coefficient θ in ϕ1, ϕ2.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have considered a general two-player nonzero-sum impulse game, whose state
variable follows a diffusive dynamics driven by a multi-dimensional Brownian motion. After setting
the problem, we have provided a verification theorem giving sufficient conditions in order for the
solutions of a suitable system of quasi-variational inequalities to coincide with the payoff functions
of the two players at some Nash equilibrium. To the best of our knowledge this result is new to the
literature on impulse games and it constitutes the major mathematical contribution of the present
paper. As an application, we have provided a solvable one-dimensional impulse game where two
players with linear running payoffs can shift a real-valued Brownian motion in order to maximize
their objective functions. We have found a family of Nash equilibria and explicitly characterized
the corresponding equilibrium strategies. We have also studied some asymptotic properties of the
Nash equilibria. As a final contribution, we have considered two further families of examples, with
cubic payoffs and with linear and cubic payoffs, where a solution is found numerically.
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A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.3. Step 1. We prove that (3.6) implies (3.7). The only property to be proved is
(3.7c). We consider three cases. First, assume V = M˜V . Since AV + f ≤ 0 and M˜V − V = 0,
we have max{AV + f,M˜V − V } = 0, which implies (3.7c) since H˜V − V ≥ 0. Then, assume
M˜V < V < H˜V . Since AV +f = 0 and M˜V −V < 0, we have max{AV +f,M˜V −V } = 0, which
implies (3.7c) since H˜V − V > 0. Finally, assume V = H˜V . Since AV + f ≥ 0 and M˜V − V ≤ 0,
we have max{AV + f,M˜V − V } ≥ 0, which implies (3.7c) since H˜V − V = 0.
Step 2. We show that (3.7) implies (3.6). The only properties to be proved are (3.6c), (3.6d)
and (3.6e). We assume M˜V < H˜V (the case M˜V = H˜V being immediate) and consider three
cases. First, assume V = M˜V . Since H˜V −V > 0, from (3.7c) it follows that max{AV +f, 0} = 0,
which implies AV + f ≤ 0. Then, assume M˜V < V < H˜V . Since min{max{α, β}, γ} ∈ {α, β, γ}
for every α, β, γ ∈ R, and since M˜V − V < 0 < H˜V − V , from (3.7c) it follows that AV + f = 0.
Finally, assume V = H˜V . From (3.7c) it follows that max{AV + f,M˜V − V } ≥ 0, which implies
AV + f ≥ 0 since M˜V − V < 0.
Complements to the proof of Proposition 4.2. (a) Let us prove that the conditions in (4.7) and
(4.9) are equivalent to the system in (4.12). Let η = (1 − λρ)/ρ and η˜ = (1 − λ˜ρ)/ρ. By the
definition of ϕ2 in (4.5) and the change of variable in (4.11), the order condition (4.7) and the
system (4.9) write 
A1(y
∗)2 − 2ηy∗ −A2 = 0, (A.1a)
A1y¯
2 − 2ηy¯ −A2 = 0, (A.1b)
A1
(1
y¯
− 1
y∗
)
+A2(y¯ − y∗)− 2θc˜+ 2η˜ log(y¯/y∗) = 0, (A.1c)
A1(y¯ − y∗) +A2
(1
y¯
− 1
y∗
)
+ 2θc− 2η log(y¯/y∗) = 0, (A.1d)
y∗ > 0, y¯ > 0, y∗ < y¯, 1 < y¯y∗, A1(y∗)2 +A2 ≤ 0. (A.1e)
In particular, as for the conditions in (A.1e): we need y∗, y¯ > 0 by (4.11), the inequalities y∗ < y¯
and 1 < y¯y∗ correspond to (4.7), the condition A1(y∗)2 +A2 ≤ 0 corresponds to ϕ′′2(x∗2) ≤ 0. Now,
notice that A1(y
∗)2 + A2 = 2y∗(A1y∗ + η) by the equation in (A.1a). Moreover, by (A.1a) and
(A.1b) we have
1
y∗
=
A1
A2
y∗ − 2η
A2
,
1
y¯
=
A1
A2
y¯ − 2η
A2
,
which are well-defined since A2 6= 0 (indeed, A2 = 0 and (A.1a)-(A.1b) would imply either y∗ = 0
or y¯ = 0, in contradiction with (A.1e)). Hence, the system in (A.1) can be rewritten as
A1(y
∗)2 − 2ηy∗ −A2 = 0, (A.2a)
A1y¯
2 − 2ηy¯ −A2 = 0, (A.2b)
A21 +A
2
2
A2
(y¯ − y∗)− 2θc˜+ 2η˜ log(y¯/y∗) = 0, (A.2c)
A1(y¯ − y∗) + θc− η log(y¯/y∗) = 0, (A.2d)
y∗ > 0, y¯ > 0, y∗ < y¯, 1 < y¯y∗, A1y∗ − η ≤ 0. (A.2e)
We finally get (4.12) by substituting (A.2c) with the sum of (A.2c) and (A.2d).
(b) Let us prove that (4.16) is equivalent to (4.18). By the definition of ξ and (4.16b), we have√
η2 +A1A2 = ξ,
which immediately leads to
A1A2 = ξ
2 − η2 = −M,
28
with M > 0 as in (4.18). Notice that η2 + A1A2 > 0 is then always verified. Moreover, by using
(4.16b) to rewrite the logarithm and by the relations
√
η2 +A1A2 = ξ and A1A2 = ξ
2 − η2, the
equation in (4.16a) can be rewritten as
(A1 +A2)
2ξ +A1A2
[
θ(c− c˜) + (λ− λ˜)2ξ + θc
η
]
= 0.
By (4.16c) we then have
A1 +A2 = −
√
(η2 − ξ2)[θη(c− c˜) + (λ− λ˜)(2ξ + θc)]
ηξ
= −2N,
with N > 0 as in (4.18). Notice that A1 +A2 < 0 is then always satisfied.
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